comparing several countries or cases

Egorov, G., Guriev, S. i Sonin, K. (2009), „Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media“, American Political Science Review 103(4): 645–668.

Egorov, G., Guriev, S. i Sonin, K. (2009), "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media", American Political Science Review 103(4): 645–668.

Contribution to this answer

Egorov, Guriev and Sonin explain why the dictator sometimes intentionally suffers from freer media even though they are politically annoying: without independent information, it is difficult to know whether his officials are really doing the job or just reporting to him what he wants to hear. The media can thus be the instrument by which the top control its own bureaucracy.

Detailed analysis of one or several cases

Lorentzen, P. (2014), „China’s Strategic Censorship“, American Journal of Political Science 58(2): 402–414.

Contribution to this answer

Lorentzen shows why authoritarian authorities can allow investigative journalism on local issues: it exposes corruption, mismanagement and dissatisfaction that otherwise lower levels might hide. But this same information becomes dangerous if it shows citizens that discontent is broad and helps them to coordinate.

analysis of institutions in China

Truex, R. (2016), Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer

Truex shows how the Chinese government uses controlled representation as another channel of information: MPs can transfer the needs of citizens and push solutions to politically insensitive problems, while the border is set where representation could turn into political competition. Thus, the government receives feedback without opening the whole system.

Explain how the system works

Wallace, J. (2022), Seeking Truth and Hiding Facts: Information, Ideology, and Authoritarianism in China, Oxford University Press.

Contribution to this answer

Wallace shows why even a huge amount of government data does not automatically solve the information problem: when an employee’s progress is tied to several desirable numbers, they have a reason to beautify those numbers. The top can therefore build a sophisticated system of measurement and at the same time become blind to problems that do not fit into what it wants to measure and reward.

Detailed analysis of one or several cases

Blaydes, L. (2011), Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer

Blaydes shows that even a controlled election can give the upper hand information about its own elites: in Egypt, the ability of party people to limit the opposition result served as a signal of their political ability and loyalty, while the election game helped the regime decide who deserved access to positions and rents.