AUTLAS Research Base

Linz, J. J. (2000), Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner.

What the source contributes

“It separates authoritarian from totalitarian and democratic rule and shows why limited space for different political groups, weak accountability and uncertain boundaries of government should be viewed together.

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), „Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited“, Public Choice 143: 67–101.

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited", Public Choice 143: 67–101.

What the source contributes

It sets clear rules for distinguishing between democracy and dictatorship, and warns that the assessment depends on how we measure competition and the possibility of power losing the election.

Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), „Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective“, Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.

Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective", Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.

What the source contributes

Updates the types of authoritarian systems and shows that party, military, monarchical and multi-party systems do not survive in the same way.

Teorell, J. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „Beyond Democracy–Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789–2016“, Perspectives on Politics 17(1): 66–84.

What the source contributes

Breaks down the power of government into multiple parts and prevents complex systems from being mistakenly reduced to one label or one trait of a leader.

Brancati, D. (2014), „Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects“, Annual Review of Political Science 17: 313–326.

What the source contributes

“It explains how institutions that only appear democratic on paper can serve the survival of authoritarian government, but also open up risks that the government does not fully control.

Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that authoritarian power must simultaneously control society and share power with the people it relies on, so the leader is never the only important participant.

Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It follows how dictatorships arise, how power is distributed in them, how power is attached to one man, how long they last and how they fall, and gives the widest basis for the whole map.

Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.

What the source contributes

It explains how people within authoritarian government share positions and power and why a deal only lasts when there are rules that protect them from arbitrary leaders.

Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2014), „Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set“, Perspectives on Politics 12(2): 313–331.

What the source contributes

"It separates the departure of the leader, the end of the old way of governing and the coming of democracy, and shows that these three events are often mistaken for the same change.

Maerz, S. F. (2020), „The Many Faces of Authoritarian Persistence“, Government and Opposition 55(1): 64–87.

What the source contributes

It shows that systems survive with different combinations of strategies and that no individual pillar is sufficient in all cases.

Ginsburg, T. i Huq, A. Z. (2018), How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, University of Chicago Press.

What the source contributes

“It links the way the rules are written with the political strategy and shows that constitutional brakes can both slow down and facilitate the weakening of democracy.

Carothers, C. (2022), „Taking Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Reform Seriously“, Perspectives on Politics 20(1): 69–85.

What the source contributes

“It shows that some authoritarian authorities can really reduce corruption, but by gathering power and control in one place, thus strengthening the whole system.

Hanson, J. K. i Sigman, R. (2021), „Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research“, Journal of Politics 83(4): 1495–1510.

What the source contributes

“It distinguishes between the state’s ability to collect taxes, coordinate services and implement decisions, and thus shows why strong police do not mean that the state is doing well in all areas.

Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Linking the durability of the system to the organization of the ruling party and showing why similar electoral pressures do not produce the same outcomes.

Bermeo, N. (2016), „On Democratic Backsliding“, Journal of Democracy 27(1): 5–19.

What the source contributes

It shows why the gradual expansion of the executive branch and the planned imposition of electoral conditions have replaced many open coups and gross electoral fraud.

Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2021), Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Emphasises deep political divisions, the rearrangement of the party system and the gradual undermining as related conditions that open the room for the executive to further strengthen their own power.

Lührmann, A. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?“, Democratization 26(7): 1095–1113.

Lührmann, A. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), "A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?", Democratization 26(7): 1095–1113.

What the source contributes

Documenting the contemporary weakening of democracy as a largely gradual process that often begins in electoral systems and affects several parts of democracy.

Waldner, D. i Lust, E. (2018), „Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding“, Annual Review of Political Science 21: 93–113.

What the source contributes

It shows that the same visible sign of weakening democracy can have different causes and lead to different outcomes.

Grillo, E., Luo, Z., Nalepa, M. i Prato, C. (2024), „Theories of Democratic Backsliding“, Annual Review of Political Science 27: 381–400.

What the source contributes

Sorts out the ways in which democracy weakens according to who initiates change, what citizens know and how the rules of conduct in institutions change.

Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.

What the source contributes

It shows how elected leaders use lawful procedures and a series of separate changes to gradually remove the limitations of their own power.

Lührmann, A. (2021), „Disrupting the Autocratization Sequence: Towards Democratic Resilience“, Democratization 28(5): 1017–1039.

Lührmann, A. (2021), "Disrupting the Autocratization Sequence: Towards Democratic Resilience", Democratization 28(5): 1017–1039.

What the source contributes

It shows that the weakening of democracy is not irreversible and marks the places where people in institutions and society can break this sequence.

Laebens, M. G. i Lührmann, A. (2021), „What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability“, Democratization 28(5): 908–928.

What the source contributes

It shows that the assembly, courts, media, citizens and electoral bodies can stop the weakening of democracy even after it has begun, but not in the same way in every country.

Panzano, G. i Tomini, L. (2026), „Unity Makes Strength: Patterns of Democratic Resistance against Autocratization“, European Journal of Political Research, First View: 1–26.

What the source contributes

He finds that there is no single move that is always necessary, but that the combined resistance of institutions, politics, society and external partners most often accompanies the survival of democracy.

Przeworski, A. (2023), „Formal Models of Authoritarian Regimes: A Critique“, Perspectives on Politics 21(3): 979–988.

What the source contributes

He warns that orderly theoretical models sometimes assume exactly what should be proved and that government cannot be explained by one simple rule that applies everywhere.

Landau, D. (2013), „Abusive Constitutionalism“, UC Davis Law Review 47: 189–260.

Landau, D. (2013), "Abusive Constitutionalism", UC Davis Law Review 47: 189–260.

What the source contributes

It shows how constitutional changes can formally follow the procedure, and fundamentally reduce competition and restrictions on executive power.

Varol, O. O. (2015), „Stealth Authoritarianism“, Iowa Law Review 100: 1673–1742.

What the source contributes

Describes the abuse of seemingly neutral legal mechanisms against competition and warns that the authoritarian goal is not always seen from the text of the rules.

Little, A. T. i Meng, A. (2024), „What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding“, PS: Political Science & Politics 57(2): 224–229.

Little, A. T. i Meng, A. (2024), "What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding", PS: Political Science & Politics 57(2): 224–229.

What the source contributes

Separates solid knowledge from popular assumptions and especially warns about problems of measurement, causation and selection of cases.

Boix, C. i Svolik, M. W. (2013), „The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government“, Journal of Politics 75(2): 300–316.

What the source contributes

“It shows that the rules within a dictatorship can make power-sharing more reliable when the people around the leader do not otherwise have a safe way to stop them.

Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.

What the source contributes

“It shows that parties and parliaments can arrange concessions and cooperation with social groups, instead of just being an empty set.

Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It links loyalty, fear, money and economic results and shows that different dictatorships use different ratios of reward and punishment.

Gandhi, J. (2008), Political Institutions under Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It explains when dictators set up parties and parliaments to buy cooperation, share benefits and reduce the risk of opposition.

Magaloni, B. (2008), „Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule“, Comparative Political Studies 41(4–5): 715–741.

What the source contributes

“It shows how the ruling party can limit the leader’s arbitrariness and make sharing benefits and changing leaders more predictable.

Hassan, M., Mattingly, D. i Nugent, E. R. (2022), „Political Control“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 155–174.

What the source contributes

“It links personnel policy, territorial control, the attachment of important people to power and pressure, and shows that power depends on people implementing decisions at lower levels.

Pepinsky, T. B., Pierskalla, J. H. i Sacks, A. (2017), „Bureaucracy and Service Delivery“, Annual Review of Political Science 20: 249–268.

What the source contributes

It connects good organization, independence and the presence of public administration in society with higher quality services and shows that more money does not automatically mean better work.

Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.

What the source contributes

Separates political control from professional independence and shows how employee choice and schedule change corruption, quality of work and responsibility.

Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.

What the source contributes

“It shows that officials respond to political pressure not only with silence or departure, but with different combinations of voice, withdrawal and interference.

Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.

Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.

What the source contributes

It examines how attacks on democratic controls alter the sense of pressure and behavior of civil servants and shows that professional rules may weaken, but do not disappear overnight.

Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that the way the police, military and security services are established to protect the leaders shapes who are being targeted by violence and how broad it is becoming.

De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that parallel forces can reduce the likelihood of a successful coup, but increase the rivalry, costs and risk of further spreading violence.

Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.

Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.

What the source contributes

“It examines family ties, parallel services and personnel moves by leaders to protect power from their own armies and shows how often it disrupts her professional work.

Meng, A. (2020), Constraining Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that firm and accepted rules can limit a leader and facilitate a more peaceful change of leader, but only if they empower people and groups capable of implementing them.

Talmadge, C. (2015), The Dictator’s Army, Cornell University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows the cost of political control of the military: an organization that is safer for a leader may be less capable of war and complex operations.

Barany, Z. (2016), How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why, Princeton University Press.

What the source contributes

Explains why armies in revolutionary crises choose punishment and intimidation, neutrality or the transition to the side of the protesters depending on the internal connection, interests and links to the system.

Paine, J. (2022), „Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators“, American Political Science Review 116(4): 1425–1442.

What the source contributes

“Differs the danger of the military ousting the leader from the danger of refusing to defend him and shows why threats from within and from outside seek a different organization of coercion.

Timoneda, J. C., Escribà-Folch, A. i Chin, J. (2023), „The Rush to Personalize“, British Journal of Political Science 53(3): 878–901.

What the source contributes

“It shows that unsuccessful coups often trigger a sudden, rather than gradual, concentration of power in the hands of leaders.

Davenport, C. (2007), „State Repression and Political Order“, Annual Review of Political Science 10: 1–23.

What the source contributes

It shows that the extent of punishment depends on the perceived threat, the strength of the civil service and the existing rules, and that the consequences for the gathering of people are not always the same.

Earl, J. (2003), „Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression“, Sociological Theory 21(1): 44–68.

What the source contributes

It extends the view from open violence to indirect, bureaucratic, state and private pressures, so such punishments do not disappear from the analysis just because they are not physical.

Ritter, E. H. i Conrad, C. R. (2016), „Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression“, American Political Science Review 110(1): 85–99.

What the source contributes

Shows that the government chooses punishment and intimidation according to the expected threat and its own limitations, while opponents adapt tactics to the expected reaction of the state.

Petrović, V. (2026), „Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia“, Democratization.

Petrović, V. (2026), “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia”, Democratization.

What the source contributes

It shows how in Serbia political benefits and pressure can appear together, so work or service are not always separated from the fear of being lost.

González, Y. M. (2020), Authoritarian Police in Democracy: Contested Security in Latin America, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows why the police can remain an authoritarian island even after democratic elections: it preserves its own power, and politicians sometimes benefit from its old habits.

Chenoweth, E. i Stephan, M. J. (2011), Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press.

What the source contributes

Findings that nonviolent campaigns have historically succeeded more often because they allow wider participation, easier to change methods and attract people from government, with the warning that comparison is not a perfect experiment.

Beissinger, M. R. (2022), The Revolutionary City: Urbanization and the Global Transformation of Rebellion, Princeton University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how urban concentration, demonstration effects and the speed of events change the possibility of a mass revolution, as well as its political consequences.

Gandhi, J. i Lust-Okar, E. (2009), „Elections under Authoritarianism“, Annual Review of Political Science 12: 403–422.

What the source contributes

“It shows that authoritarian elections can at the same time justify power, measure support, bind important people to the system and launch supporters, but also open up space for the opposition.

Schedler, A. (2013), The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism, Oxford University Press.

What the source contributes

It explains the authoritarian system that maintains elections as managing the uncertainty in which the government wants to win, but must not completely abolish the contest without losing the benefits of the elections.

Magaloni, B. (2006), Voting for Autocracy, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

“It shows how the overwhelming ruling party combines state affairs and money, the expectation of victory, the discipline of its leadership and the launch of voters, but also how this system can break down.

Blaydes, L. (2011), Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that even controlled elections distribute positions and benefits within the system and reveal the local networks that the government should maintain.

Miller, M. K. (2015), „Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815“, British Journal of Political Science 45(3): 501–530.

What the source contributes

“It shows that authoritarian elections with multiple parties can help create long-term organizations and rules needed by democracies, even though they can consolidate power in the short term.

Levitsky, S. i Way, L. A. (2010), Competitive Authoritarianism, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Shows how electoral competition can be real, but systematically unequal in media, resources, law and government services.

Greene, K. F. (2007), Why Dominant Parties Lose, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Linking the ruling party’s dominance with access to state money and jobs and showing why economic and organizational changes can equalize the electoral match.

Howard, M. M. i Roessler, P. G. (2006), „Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes“, American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 365–381.

What the source contributes

“It shows that joint opposition and fewer punishments increase the chance of elections opening political space, but they do not guarantee democracy themselves.

Gehlbach, S. i Sonin, K. (2014), „Government Control of the Media“, Journal of Public Economics 118: 163–171.

What the source contributes

Shows why the government chooses between media that strongly promote its story and media that the audience trusts more, so complete control is not always the most useful.

Moustafa, T. (2014), „Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 281–299.

What the source contributes

It shows that the courts can help the authorities manage and justify their decisions, but under certain conditions they can also become the actual venue of the dispute.

Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. i Brusco, V. (2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

“It shows how local mediators share benefits, follow political ties, and sometimes work against the wishes of the party leadership, so exchanging support for the service is not a simple command from above.

Hicken, A. (2011), „Clientelism“, Annual Review of Political Science 14: 289–310.

What the source contributes

Separates vote buying, giving jobs and benefits to political supporters and long-term exchange and shows why different relationships often mix under the same name.

Hicken, A. i Nathan, N. L. (2020), „Clientelism’s Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 23: 277–294.

What the source contributes

Warns that poverty, culture or secrecy of the vote do not themselves explain political trade without intermediaries, believable rewards or punishments and appropriate electoral conditions.

Bhasin, T. i Gandhi, J. (2013), „Timing and Targeting of State Repression in Authoritarian Elections“, Electoral Studies 32(4): 620–631.

What the source contributes

“It shows that punishment and intimidation around elections have a carefully chosen time and target and that the election calendar changes the price of open opposition.

Bunce, V. J. i Wolchik, S. L. (2011), Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how important the agreement of the opposition, working with voters, observing elections and learning from the experiences of other countries are, with a warning that regional conditions change the outcome a lot.

Gamboa, L. (2022), Resisting Backsliding: Opposition Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that the opposition is better guarding the democratic space when it chooses the goals and means that bring together a wider circle of people and does not give the authorities an easy excuse to close the system.

Ong, E. (2022), Opposing Power: Building Opposition Alliances in Electoral Autocracies, University of Michigan Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how opposition parties combine fieldwork, alliances and adaptation to pressure, and why the plan must fit local conditions.

Reuter, O. J. (2017), The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

“It shows that superior parties arise when leaders need powerful people from different backgrounds, and they believe that the party will reliably share positions and protections.

Meng, A. (2021), „Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength“, British Journal of Political Science 51(2): 526–540.

What the source contributes

He warns that the formal existence of the party is not the same as its organizational strength and that the consequences depend on the actual real presence in society and independence.

Albertus, M. (2015), Autocracy and Redistribution, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that authoritarian power can redistribute a great deal, but often to weaken old powerhouses and create new political-dependent winners, not to give everyone equal rights.

Moustafa, T. (2007), The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how the system can empower the courts for economic governance and then face the legal space used by citizens and the opposition.

Ginsburg, T. i Moustafa, T. (ur.) (2008), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Comparing different functions of law under authoritarianism and preventing the conclusion that each court or law is only an empty decoration.

Ginsburg, T. i Simpser, A. (ur.) (2014), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

“It shows that the constitutions regulate relations within the government, announce its intentions and justify it even when they do not allow citizens real control.

Whiting, S. H. (2023), „Authoritarian Legality and State Capitalism in China“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 19: 357–373.

What the source contributes

It shows that the law can be clear and predictable in ordinary disputes, and that in politically important cases it depends on the will of the authorities.

Scheuerman, W. E. (2006), „Emergency Powers“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2: 257–277.

What the source contributes

It shows that extraordinary powers can help to act quickly, but without a clear deadline and firm control, they easily become a permanent means of abuse.

Gilad, S., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. i Levi-Faur, D. (2025), „A Taste for Government Employment Also Rests on Its Political Flavor“, Public Administration Review 85(5): 1412–1425.

What the source contributes

It shows that the resistance of employees depends on professional self-esteem, expected support and whether there are safe procedures through which they can stand up, not just personal courage.

Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), „Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention“, Public Money & Management 46(4).

Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), “Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention”, Public Money & Management 46(4).

What the source contributes

Shows how temporary appointments and party control of the top management make the mandate more precarious and narrow the space for professional disagreement.

Gross, O. i Ní Aoláin, F. (2006), Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Comparing models of extraordinary powers and showing that formal declaration of exceptions does not solve the issue of control, duration and return to regular rules.

Carothers, C. (2023), „The Autocrat’s Corruption Dilemma“, Government and Opposition 58(1): 22–38.

Carothers, C. (2023), "The Autocrat's Corruption Dilemma", Government and Opposition 58(1): 22–38.

What the source contributes

He explains that money and privileges bind allies to power, but at the same time they spoil the work of the state, the flow of information and the trust of citizens.

Ross, M. L. (2001), „Does Oil Hinder Democracy?“, World Politics 53(3): 325–361.

Ross, M. L. (2001), "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?", World Politics 53(3): 325–361.

What the source contributes

“It links oil revenues with less dependence on citizens’ taxes and more money for political supporters and the apparatus of force, with the warning that this effect is not the same everywhere.

Morrison, K. M. (2009), „Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability“, International Organization 63(1): 107–138.

What the source contributes

Shows that different non-tax revenues can increase stability by allowing more consumption and less dependence of the state on taxed citizens.

Escribà-Folch, A. i Wright, J. (2015), Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, Oxford University Press.

What the source contributes

“It shows that sanctions don’t work the same when power is tied to one man, an army or a party, and that the people at the top can transfer their costs to the citizens.

Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2016), Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change, Princeton University Press.

What the source contributes

It links the behaviour of important people in government, mass gatherings, conflicts over money and positions and the work of institutions to explain both democratic change and authoritarian upheaval.

Wallace, J. (2022), Seeking Truth and Hiding Facts: Information, Ideology, and Authoritarianism in China, Oxford University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that the government is looking for true data while punishing bad news, so people at the lower levels are beautifying the information they need.

Petrova, M. (2008), „Inequality and Media Capture“, Journal of Public Economics 92(1–2): 183–212.

What the source contributes

“It connects the economic dependence of the media with the possibility of political buying of content and shows that market weakness changes the price of editorial independence.

Schiffrin, A. (ur.) (2017), In the Service of Power: Media Capture and the Threat to Democracy, CIMA/NED.

What the source contributes

Shows how ownership, state advertising, licenses and subsidies can together put the media under control and without formal censorship.

Guriev, S. i Treisman, D. (2020), „A Theory of Informational Autocracy“, Journal of Public Economics 186: 104158.

What the source contributes

Explains how control of information can maintain the popularity of government and why more educated and connected societies encourage more covert and not necessarily milder forms of control.

Rosenfeld, B. i Wallace, J. (2024), „Information Politics and Propaganda in Authoritarian Societies“, Annual Review of Political Science 27: 263–281.

What the source contributes

It places propaganda among other ways of managing information censorship, mood monitoring, and assessing whether people will believe the message.

Roberts, M. E. (2018), Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall, Princeton University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that friction, fear and information overload can limit access to content even when citizens can technically bypass the blockage.

Milli, S. i dr. (2025), „Engagement, user satisfaction, and the amplification of divisive content on social media“, PNAS Nexus 4(3): pgaf062.

What the source contributes

It shows that engagement-based rankings can amplify politically disruptive content even without a central command, which is important for distinguishing systemic manipulation from platform incentives.

Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K., Doan, T. N. i Crockett, M. J. (2021), „How Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks“, Science Advances 7(33): eabe5641.

Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K., Doan, T. N. i Crockett, M. J. (2021), "How Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks", Science Advances 7(33): eabe5641.

What the source contributes

It shows that platforms themselves reward content that causes resentment, so deep divisions on the internet may not always be the result of centrally driven propaganda.

King, G., Pan, J. i Roberts, M. E. (2013), „How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression“, American Political Science Review 107(2): 326–343.

What the source contributes

He finds that in the studied Chinese system, censorship is particularly focused on the potential of collective action, not on any criticism of the authorities.

King, G., Pan, J. i Roberts, M. E. (2017), „How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction“, American Political Science Review 111(3): 484–501.

What the source contributes

Shows a strategy of distracting and positively cluttering space, rather than constantly persuading or arguing with critics.

Lorentzen, P. (2014), „China’s Strategic Censorship“, American Journal of Political Science 58(2): 402–414.

What the source contributes

It shows why the government sometimes allows controlled criticism as a source of information, while preventing critics from coming together and organizing.

Truex, R. (2016), Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how controlled representative institutions can provide information and limited responses to citizens without introducing full political competition.

Toepler, S., Zimmer, A., Fröhlich, C. i Obuch, K. (2020), „The Changing Space for NGOs: Civil Society in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes“, VOLUNTAS 31: 649–662.

What the source contributes

It shows that the government does not only have to prohibit the organization, but can weaken it by registering, financial conditions, smearing or cooperating only with selected groups.

Roberts, M. E. (2020), „Resilience to Online Censorship“, Annual Review of Political Science 23: 401–419.

What the source contributes

Compare when people bypass censorship, when they give up and when restrictions cause the opposite effect, and show why the technological blockade is not always effective.

Guriev, S. i Treisman, D. (2019), „Informational Autocrats“, Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4): 100–127.

What the source contributes

It describes authorities investing more in the image of expertise, information control and targeted punishment than in open mass violence.

Schlumberger, O., Edel, M., Maati, A. i Saglam, K. (2024), „How Authoritarianism Transforms: A Framework for the Study of Digital Dictatorship“, Government and Opposition 59(3): 761–783.

What the source contributes

It distinguishes the use of new tools for old methods of control from the actual change in way of government and warns that technology does not have the same effect in all systems.

Paglayan, A. S. (2026), „Education as a Political Institution“, Annual Review of Political Science 29: 525–546.

What the source contributes

It shows that education shapes values, inequality, political ties, surveillance and the ability of the state, so it is not just a neutral public service.

Cantoni, D. i dr. (2017), „Curriculum and Ideology“, Journal of Political Economy 125(2): 338–392.

What the source contributes

It shows that changing the curriculum can change students’ political attitudes measurably, but the findings from China should not be automatically transferred to other systems.

Neundorf, A., Nazrullaeva, E., Northmore-Ball, K., Tertytchnaya, K. i Kim, W. (2024), „Varieties of Indoctrination: The Politicization of Education and the Media around the World“, Perspectives on Politics 22(3): 771–798.

What the source contributes

Compare how the government uses education and media to shape attitudes and show that different systems do this with different combinations of school, message and social pressure.

Wedeen, L. (1999), Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, University of Chicago Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that public obedience rituals can discipline behavior even when people don’t believe literally in the message of the system.

Feldstein, S. (2021), The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology Is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance, Oxford University Press.

What the source contributes

It connects surveillance, content filtering, network shutdown and targeted harassment with the real capabilities of the state and companies that sell technology to it.

Xu, X. (2021), „To Repress or to Co-opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance“, American Journal of Political Science 65(2): 309–325.

What the source contributes

It shows that digital surveillance allows for more precise punishment and can make buying political cooperation cheaper, but only if the state can and can actually use it.

Conduit, D. (2025), „Digital Authoritarianism and the Global Technology Industry: Evidence from Iran“, Government and Opposition 60(3): 751–772.

What the source contributes

It shows how foreign private companies fill the technological and professional gaps of government and thus become part of the system for monitoring and punishing people.

Tansey, O. (2016), The International Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Oxford University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how money, support and interference from abroad change relations within the government and can prolong its survival.

Cooley, A. i Heathershaw, J. (2017), Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia, Yale University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how banks, real estate, lawyers, lobbyists and reputation-fixing services in democracies help authoritarian elites hide money and expand influence.

Chenoweth, E. (2021), Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press.

What the source contributes

“It sums up what keeps a lasting campaign together organization, discipline, a large number of participants and a change of loyalty and clearly distinguishes it from a single protest.

Han, H., Baggetta, M. i Oser, J. (2024), „Organizing and Democracy: Understanding the Possibilities for Transformative Collective Action“, Annual Review of Political Science 27: 245–262.

What the source contributes

It shows that a permanent organization builds relationships, leadership, and the ability to act together that visibility alone or a large range on the Internet cannot replace.

Egorov, G., Guriev, S. i Sonin, K. (2009), „Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media“, American Political Science Review 103(4): 645–668.

Egorov, G., Guriev, S. i Sonin, K. (2009), "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media", American Political Science Review 103(4): 645–668.

What the source contributes

Shows that media leaders may need to detect the bad work of officials, especially when there is not enough money to cover up or compensate for any mistakes.

Kuran, T. (1995), Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification, Harvard University Press.

What the source contributes

“It explains how people publicly support an outcome they privately don’t want when they expect social or political punishment for being honest.

Gerschewski, J. (2023), The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Separates the support of citizens from the interest of people around the government and thus prevents honest approval from being confused with positions and benefits.

Miller, D. T. (2023), „A Century of Pluralistic Ignorance: What We Have Learned About Its Origins, Forms, and Consequences“, Frontiers in Social Psychology 1.

What the source contributes

It shows how people systematically misjudge the attitudes of others and thus maintain norms that most do not support privately.

Oser, J., Grinson, A., Boulianne, S. i Halperin, E. (2022), „How Political Efficacy Relates to Online and Offline Political Participation: A Multilevel Meta-analysis“, Political Communication 39(5): 607–633.

Oser, J., Grinson, A., Boulianne, S. i Halperin, E. (2022), "How Political Efficacy Relates to Online and Offline Political Participation: A Multilevel Meta-analysis", Political Communication 39(5): 607–633.

What the source contributes

“It sums up the results of 48 studies and finds that people who believe they can change more politically are more likely to engage both online and offline, but it doesn’t prove that only strengthening that feeling always triggers action.

Kuran, T. (1991), „Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989“, World Politics 44(1): 7–48.

What the source contributes

It shows how hiding private opinion can make the system seem stable until a small event triggers a chain of public statements.

Buckley, N., Marquardt, K. L., Reuter, O. J. i Tertytchnaya, K. (2024), „Endogenous Popularity: How Perceptions of Support Affect the Popularity of Authoritarian Regimes“, American Political Science Review 118(2): 1046–1052.

What the source contributes

It shows that the impression of other people’s support can increase their own approval of the government, so the public popularity partly produces itself.

Geddes, B. i Zaller, J. (1989), „Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes“, American Journal of Political Science 33(2): 319–347.

What the source contributes

“It shows that support for authoritarian rule can come from real results, from what people have learned for a long time, and from the information available to them, not just from fear or dishonest response.

Michel, J., Miller, M. K. i Peters, M. E. (2023), „How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates: Evidence from East Germany“, International Organization 77(3): 527–563.

Michel, J., Miller, M. K. i Peters, M. E. (2023), “How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates: Evidence from East Germany,” International Organization 77(3): 527–563.

What the source contributes

“It shows that the government can allow people to leave the country as a way to reduce discontent, but retain those that are important to its economy or security.

Gerschewski, J. (2013), „The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes“, Democratization 20(1): 13–38.

What the source contributes

It links creating support, tying important groups to power, and punishing opponents as three interdependent pillars of survival, rather than treating propaganda or coercion as the only explanation.

Dukalskis, A. i Gerschewski, J. (2017), „What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation“, Contemporary Politics 23(3): 251–268.

Dukalskis, A. i Gerschewski, J. (2017), "What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation", Contemporary Politics 23(3): 251–268.

What the source contributes

“Compare the stories by which authoritarian authorities justify their power and show that such justifications are not just a decoration with fear and punishment.

Spires, A. J. (2011), „Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival of China’s Grassroots NGOs“, American Journal of Sociology 117(1): 1–45.

What the source contributes

It shows how more independent organizations can survive through the tacit exchange of services and political inconspicuousness, while the limit of tolerance is constantly changing.

Teets, J. C. (2014), Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Explains the system in which the government allows experts and organizations to participate in a limited discussion, but reserves the right to close the space.

Rutzen, D. (2015), „Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): Civil Society Under Assault“, Journal of Democracy 26(4): 28–39.

What the source contributes

Document the expansion of the law on foreign agents, financing and registration as a way of narrowing the space without a formal ban on all organizations.

Schleutker, E. (2021), „Co-optation and Repression of Religion in Authoritarian Regimes“, Politics and Religion 14(2): 209–240.

What the source contributes

Shows how power towards religious groups combines access to institutions, material concessions, restrictions and punishments.

Yan, X. (2014), „Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China“, China Quarterly 218: 493–513.

What the source contributes

It shows how students are controlled by staff selection, organizations and supervision and why the faculty is not only a place of teaching but also a place of political organization.

Kim, W. i Gandhi, J. (2010), „Coopting Workers under Dictatorship“, Journal of Politics 72(3): 646–658.

What the source contributes

Finds that dictatorships with firm rules and organizations offer workers more benefits in return for peace and record fewer protests, making unions a channel of representation and control.

Robertson, G. B. (2007), „Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes“, American Political Science Review 101(4): 781–798.

What the source contributes

It shows that weak or controlled labour organizations are changing the form of strikes and the link of economic discontent with political pressure.

Koesel, K. J. (2014), Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that religious communities can exchange resources with the state, build independence or become targets of control, depending on mutual needs and uncertainties.

Earl, J. i Braithwaite, J. M. (2022), „Layers of Political Repression: Integrating Research on Social Movement Repression“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 18: 227–248.

What the source contributes

It links legal barriers, bureaucratic pressures, digital attacks and violence, and shows why we need to distinguish between who is punishing, who is hurting and what harm he is doing.

Tsourapas, G. (2021), „Global Autocracies: Strategies of Transnational Repression, Legitimation, and Co-Optation in World Politics“, International Studies Review 23(3): 616–644.

What the source contributes

Fixes in one map different ways to pressure people in the diaspora: tracking, family threats, kidnappings, digital attacks and travel control.

Wasow, O. (2020), „Agenda Seeding: How 1960s Black Protests Moved Elites, Public Opinion, and Voting“, American Political Science Review 114(3): 638–659.

What the source contributes

It shows that non-violent protests and punishment and intimidation against them can shift the media and the public towards civil rights, while violence can shift attention to order.

Chenoweth, E. (2023), „The Role of Violence in Nonviolent Resistance“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 55–77.

What the source contributes

It shows that violent and nonviolent tactics often interfere and that the effect of violence depends on the target, the order of events, the system and the audience’s reaction.

Manekin, D. i Mitts, T. (2022), „Effective for Whom? Ethnic Identity and Nonviolent Resistance“, American Political Science Review 116(1): 161–180.

What the source contributes

It shows that the ethnic structure of the movement and the relations between the majority and the minority limit the general conclusion that nonviolence is equally accessible and effective for all.

Kirisci, M. i Demirhan, E. (2021), „Resource Wealth as Leverage: Natural Resources and the Failure of Non-Violent Campaigns“, Government and Opposition 56(1): 102–120.

What the source contributes

Findings that natural resources increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns failing because they give the system the means to neutralize domestic and external support for the movement.

O’Donnell, G. i Schmitter, P. C. (1986), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that divisions within the government, negotiations and uncertainty can open the transition from the authoritarian system, but they do not predetermine that the outcome will be democratic.

Riedl, R. B., Slater, D., Wong, J. i Ziblatt, D. (2020), „Authoritarian-Led Democratization“, Annual Review of Political Science 23: 315–332.

What the source contributes

“It shows that people at the top sometimes open the system when they don’t have a better choice or when they feel they can safely handle an election defeat.

Loxton, J. i Mainwaring, S. (ur.) (2018), Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

Shows how successor parties guard the organization, brand, networks and voters of the authoritarian system and can survive or win in a democracy.

Vinjamuri, L. i Snyder, J. (2015), „Law and Politics in Transitional Justice“, Annual Review of Political Science 18: 303–327.

What the source contributes

It shows that trials, amnesty and other measures of responsibility are always a combination of legal norms and political relations of forces, with uneven consequences.

Bakiner, O. (2021), „Truth Commission Impact on Policy, Courts, and Society“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 17: 73–91.

What the source contributes

Finds a range of limited successes to serious disappointments and shows that the effect of commissions depends on the policy, implementation of recommendations and success criteria.

Ambrosio, T. (2009), Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union, Ashgate.

What the source contributes

It shows how authoritarian states use diplomacy, international organizations, and the language of law and values to weaken the pressure for democracy in the neighbourhood.

Debre, M. J. (2022), „Clubs of Autocrats: Regional Organizations and Authoritarian Survival“, The Review of International Organizations 17(3): 485–511.

What the source contributes

It shows how the regional organizations of authoritarian states provide the belief that the government has the right to rule, monitor, police cooperation and protection from external pressures.

Way, L. A. (2015), Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows that a weak state and divided people at the top sometimes prevent the full consolidation of authoritarian power even when democratic rules are not strong.

Glasius, M. (2018), „Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices: A Framework“, Globalizations 15(2): 179–197.

Glasius, M. (2018), "Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices: A Framework", Globalizations 15(2): 179–197.

What the source contributes

It separates the authoritarian system from the authoritarian practice and shows how surveillance, threats and control can cross the borders of the state.

Moss, D. M. (2021), The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora Activism against Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.

What the source contributes

It shows how leaving the country can open up a new voice and resources for the opposition, but also expose activists to cross-border surveillance and pressure.

Cleary, M. R. i Öztürk, A. (2022), „When Does Backsliding Lead to Breakdown? Uncertainty and Opposition Strategies in Democracies at Risk“, Perspectives on Politics 20(1): 205–221.

What the source contributes

It shows that the actions of the opposition and respect for democratic actions can slow down a government that is expanding its powers, but does not erase the advantage that the government already has.