How do acting directors, funding, and ignored decisions bring an institution under control?
The interim manager knows that his survival depends on the next decision of the authorities, so he has a reason to guess in advance what is expected of him. Such a position produces obedience without an open order: the risky object is not initiated, the report is mitigated, and the disobedient employee is removed so that the appointment is not called into question. Control of money acts similarly.
An institution without enough professional people, equipment or access to data cannot use the powers it has on paper. If its decisions are not yet implemented, the public learns that addressing is futile. No small budget or acting person in itself does not prove political control; it is an important pattern in which an uncertain mandate and denied resources change behavior precisely in matters important to the government.
A small budget or a delay in the decision does not in itself prove political control. They should be associated with the behavior of the institution and the concrete consequences.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows that an institution does not need to be formally abolished in order to reduce its autonomy: by changing the appointment, jurisdiction, procedures and organization, it can keep the same name and lose some of its actual ability to control the government.
review more research
Moustafa, T. (2014), „Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 281–299.
- Contribution to this answer
- Moustafa shows that formal powers and daily functioning are not the same as real independence: the institution can operate normally in most cases, and schedule just when it needs to apply the rule to a politically powerful actor.
Investigation of the conduct of civil servants
Gilad, S., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. i Levi-Faur, D. (2025), „A Taste for Government Employment Also Rests on Its Political Flavor“, Public Administration Review 85(5): 1412–1425.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gilad, Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Levi-Faur are studying political self-selection in the civil service, not acting appointments, budget control or ignoring decisions. The work is therefore very indirect here.
comparing several countries or cases
Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), „Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention“, Public Money & Management 46(4).
Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), “Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention”, Public Money & Management 46(4).
- Contribution to this answer
- Staroová, Ryb and Spáč show that career officials who expect the arrival of an illiberal government can start thinking about leaving even before the change, especially when they expect a conflict over professional integrity. The paper does not study acting mandates or budgetary dependence.
comparing several countries or cases
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.
- Contribution to this answer
- Alon-Barkat and the co-authors show that the expected politicization and democratic backsliding increase the officials’ intention to leave and reduce additional engagement and willingness to resist. This shows how political control changes the composition of the institution, but does not test the acting directors or financial suffocation in particular.
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