Research framework and broader academic knowledge base
Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Does the government respond differently to citizens when it receives money from oil, aid, or borrowing rather than taxes?
When the government receives much of the revenue from oil, foreign aid or borrowing, it depends less on the regular taxes paid by the citizens. Then there is less reason to negotiate with them about how the money is collected and spent, and more opportunity to finance the services of force, subsidies and support networks without wider responsibility.
External income can also cover up mismanagement while money is coming in. However, such money does not automatically produce authoritarian power. The outcome depends on whether the income is public, under the control of the assembly and audit, how it is distributed and whether the state already has institutions that can limit executive power. The real question is not only where the money comes from, but to whom the government has to explain its spending and who can punish it for abuse.
The impact of oil and other external income is not the same in every country. The rules, the way of spending, the time and the type of income can completely change the result.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
data from a large number of countries
Ross, M. L. (2001), „Does Oil Hinder Democracy?“, World Politics 53(3): 325–361.
Ross, M. L. (2001), "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?", World Politics 53(3): 325–361.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ross shows why oil revenues can change the relationship between government and citizens: a regime that has a large income without taxation of the population can reduce taxes, share patronage and invest more in the apparatus of coercion. On data from 113 countries he finds that oil revenues are strongly associated with authoritarian rule, and not only in the Middle East.
data from a large number of countries
Morrison, K. M. (2009), „Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability“, International Organization 63(1): 107–138.
- Contribution to this answer
- Morrison spreads the argument from oil to all non-tax revenues including state-owned firms and aid and finds that they increase the stability of the regime. In dictatorships they are associated with higher social spending, and in democracies with lower taxation of elites; more important is that the money does not come from taxes but from what exactly non-tax source it comes from.
data from a large number of countries
Albertus, M. (2015), Autocracy and Redistribution, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Albertus shows that redistribution under autocracy is not necessarily a response to the demands of the majority of citizens: the government can divide the country or other resources by weakening certain elites and creating politically useful groups of winners. That is why more government spending in itself does not mean more responsibility towards citizens.
data from a large number of countries
Escribà-Folch, A. i Wright, J. (2015), Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Escrib-Folch and Wright show that external pressure does not work equally on all authoritarian regimes: the effect of sanctions and other economic pressures depends on how the regime is organized and what resources its elites control. For this question is useful as a reminder that external money and external pressure change the calculation of power, but it is not a direct work on tax liability.
comparing several countries or cases
Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2016), Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Haggard and Kaufman show how important conflicts over the distribution of economic resources are for the emergence and survival of the regime: the way the government reacts to citizens depends on who controls economic resources, how many elites are at risk and whether the masses can organize. This is a broader framework, not an immediate test of renter logic.
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