Research framework and broader academic knowledge base
Serbia: documented application of the same framework
How do those in power decide who receives a job, assistance, or privilege and who pays the price?
The government often directs the distribution of jobs, assistance and privileges to the political value of groups. It can give more to those whose votes, money or organization are important, to those who might cross the opponent or groups whose protest it fears the most. The cost is more easily transferred to poorly organized people, distant environments or citizens who do not have access to decision-making.
Such a distribution does not always have to be open: the rule may seem general, while the criteria are set for certain users. However, any social or development policy is not a political purchase. In order to distinguish the public goal from the maintenance of power, one should look at whether the needs of the measure are consistently, who receives benefits in relation to similar groups, whether decisions are changed before the elections and whether there is a right to a reasoned appeal.
The survival of power is not the only reason for any economic decision. The distribution is also influenced by ideas, development goals, war, real needs and the ability of administration.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
data from a large number of countries
Albertus, M. (2015), Autocracy and Redistribution, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Albertus shows that authoritarian redistribution is not simply “giving to the poor”: the government chooses who gets the resources and against whom the redistribution will be directed towards the political relations of the forces. Land reform, for example, can simultaneously reward one group and weaken the elite that pose a threat to the regime.
data from a large number of countries
Morrison, K. M. (2009), „Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability“, International Organization 63(1): 107–138.
- Contribution to this answer
- Morrison shows that the additional non-tax income of the government gives more room to choose who to relieve and to whom to increase spending: in dictatorships, such income is associated with higher social spending, while the regime at the same time becomes more stable. Money therefore changes the political distribution of possible rewards.
review more research
Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wintrobe sees power as a constant balance between reward and fear: the regime shares the rents and privileges to produce loyalty, and it uses repression to increase the price of resistance. Who gets the benefit and who takes the risk is therefore not a separate issue both decisions serve to maintain political support.
Explain how the system works
Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. i Brusco, V. (2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Stokes and co-authors show how such distribution goes down to individual citizens: local mediators have information about people and decide to whom they will direct their work, help or other targeted benefit. That is why the distribution can depend on the political relationship, and not only on the formal right or need.
comparing several countries or cases
Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2016), Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Haggard and Kaufman give a broader picture: political changes and regime stability depend on conflicts between social groups over resources, on who can organize and on how the elites estimate the price of concessions. For this issue, work is more a framework that explains why distribution produces political allies and opponents, rather than a study of individual job allocation or assistance.
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