Research framework and broader academic knowledge base
Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Why do the police, military, and security services agree to carry out politically risky orders?
Police officers, soldiers and service members do not follow risky political orders just because they are “obedient”. They assess who is likely to remain in power, who controls their salary and promotion, what will happen to their family and whether they will one day be held accountable for what they have done.
The authorities increase obedience by choosing loyal elders, special privileges, supervision within the services and the message that the refusal will be punished quickly, while the execution will remain unpunished. It is also important what their colleagues do: the individual is much more difficult to refuse the order if he thinks that he will remain alone. That is why the behavior of the services in crisis can change abruptly when they assess that the balance of forces is changing and that the old protection is no longer safe.
We often find out about the internal decisions of the police and the military only after the crisis. One case can well explain the procedure, but it does not have to be valid everywhere.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows how the organization of the security apparatus shapes to whom the forced services are loyal and what kind of repression they can carry out. Individual obedience depends on the institution in which the official works, not only on the personal attitude.
comparing several countries or cases
Talmadge, C. (2015), The Dictator’s Army, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Talmadge shows that political criteria in promotion, command and training can increase loyalty to the regime, but at the same time weaken professional military capability. Career structure therefore changes the calculation of officers.
comparing several countries or cases
Barany, Z. (2016), How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Barany shows why the army in some revolutions defends the regime, in others it refuses to shoot, and in the third it is divided. The decision depends on the cohesion of the army, relations with the government, legitimacy, the character of the protest and the external environment.
data from a large number of countries
Paine, J. (2022), „Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators“, American Political Science Review 116(4): 1425–1442.
- Contribution to this answer
- Paine shows that the military has two types of possible disobedience it can threaten the dictator with a coup or refuse to protect him from opponents. The way the leader organizes civil-military relations tries to reduce both risks.
comparing several countries or cases
Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Svolik provides a broader framework: the apparatus of force is part of a coalition that maintains authoritarian power, but its members have their own interests and can become a threat to the leader. That is why the regime must constantly manage their loyalty.
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