Research framework and broader academic knowledge base
Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Why do those in power maintain several services that monitor citizens and one another?
The government makes more services because it does not want an organization to have all the power and all the confidential information in its hands. When the police, the military, intelligence services and special units have overlapping jobs, they can monitor the citizens, but also report to each other. The leader thus gets more data sources and reduces the possibility of one command peak becoming independent.
Still, the rivalry produces serious weaknesses: the services can exaggerate threats, hide failures, duplicate business or plant competitors in order to preserve their position and budget. The number of services does not prove anything. It is important who appoints their managers, to whom they report directly, whether their competencies are deliberately overlapping and whether the law can even check their work.
The number of services does not indicate who controls them. You need to know who orders them, who pays for them and who can speak directly to the leader.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows why regimes divide the coercive apparatus into multiple services and build special intelligence capacities: different institutions can track citizens, but also each other, reducing the risk of one organization becoming an independent threat.
data from a large number of countries
De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- De Bruin shows how parallel armed organizations reduce the possibility of one service monopolizing the force and carrying out a coup. Mutual competition increases the security of the leader, but can weaken coordination.
comparing several countries or cases
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.
- Contribution to this answer
- Quinlivan describes parallel forces and mutual monitoring as classic techniques of preventing coup. The regime thus supervises not only society but also its own apparatus of force.
review more research
Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wintrobe explains why such mutual monitoring is attractive to the dictator: he never has complete information about the loyalty of his associates, so he builds systems that reduce the possibility of clandestine association against him.
data from a large number of countries
Timoneda, J. C., Escribà-Folch, A. i Chin, J. (2023), „The Rush to Personalize“, British Journal of Political Science 53(3): 878–901.
- Contribution to this answer
- Timoneda, Escrib-Folch and Chin study how failed coups can accelerate the personalization of power and changes in the leader’s attitude to the apparatus of force. The work is useful for the consequences of the fear of a coup, but it is more indirect for the question of multiple services that accompany each other.
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