Research framework and broader academic knowledge base
Serbia: documented application of the same framework
How does a leader prevent the police or military from turning against them - and what does society lose as a result?
The leader prevents coup or disobedience by placing loyal people in key positions, giving the services special privileges, often changing the commanders and making parallel units that control each other. Thus, no service has complete control over force and information, so it is more difficult for it to turn against the authorities on its own.
The price, however, is passed on to the whole society. Officers and police executives thrive on political reliability, units hide data and compete, and professional training and cooperation become less important. The state can therefore be well protected from coup, but less able to protect citizens, lead complex operations or respond to a real security threat. The security of the leader and the security of the country are not the same.
A system that prevents a coup can be bad in war or protection of citizens. That is why the result depends on what threat the leader is protected against.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.
- Contribution to this answer
- Quinlivan shows how rulers prevent a coup by creating parallel forces, privileged units, personal and family ties and army surveillance systems. The price is often less professional and less efficient apparatus.
data from a large number of countries
De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- De Bruin shows that parallel armed organizations make it difficult for one force to pull off a coup, but fragmentation of command and resources may weaken the state’s ability to wage war or coordinate responses to other threats.
comparing several countries or cases
Talmadge, C. (2015), The Dictator’s Army, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Talmadge shows how political control of personnel and command can make the army safer for the regime, but weaker on the battlefield. Loyalty and professional efficiency are therefore not always the same goal.
data from a large number of countries
Paine, J. (2022), „Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators“, American Political Science Review 116(4): 1425–1442.
- Contribution to this answer
- "Paine shows the dilemma of the leader: the military must be strong enough to defend the regime against its opponents, but not autonomous enough to bring down the dictator himself.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows that forced institutions are designed according to whether the leader is more afraid of rebellion or coup. The regime can therefore consciously choose a security apparatus that is more politically reliable even though it is more socially or militarily expensive.
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